Northgate Plc - Vehicle Rentals

I have both owned and written about this company in the past. It was then a good company with a bad balance sheet; it is now a good company with a good balance sheet.

The apparent cause of the recent decline in share price is the margin deterioration highlighted above. Management has explained the margin decline as attributable to 15 (now 16) new sites in the UK that take time to ramp up -- there are start up costs and vehicles are introduced slowly but steadily as each site matures. This is not an after-the-fact excuse; I owned the stock and was paying attention in 2012/3 when Bob Contreras explained that this was in the offing. 

From the section labeled "network" in the latest interim filing we can surmise the following, more or less:

So that 

And this before a proper recovery in Spain, its other market.

In any case, a 12,5x multiple on 2017 earnings would not surprise and it seems to me that, along with dividends collected along the way, these shares offer a 100%  return.

Disclosure: No position (yet)

Brammer Plc -- Distributor of MRO components

This company is the leading provider of MRO components to industrial companies in Europe. The business model is, I think, well known: it provides suppliers a direct route to market and offers customers a single interface for accessing vast choice of products. It matches the many to many in a hub-and-spoke arrangement. Market share gains enhance the network effect and thereby entrench the leader's competitive advantage. And so on, I won't belabor the point.

Brammer has been built by acquisition so it is worth taking note of whether it has created or destroyed value as it buys specialist distributors:

The conservative answer is that its acquisitions have thus far been value-neutral:

So one might value Brammer at 2.7x its net operating assets, thereby giving it no credit for growth: 

2.7 x 150 = 410; less 61 in net debt = 348 = 269p/share. This target approximates 11.5x run rate FCF.

Brammer's share price has fallen away because of its exposure to the Nordic area, the weak Euro relative to the Pound, etc. If these things correct themselves in two years then the path to a total return of 95% or so -- 80% from capital appreciation, 14% from dividends -- should be reasonably straightforward.

If not, MRO distributors tend to be cash generative in the downswing of a cycle as they shed working capital. A stylized illustration of that principle as applied to Brammer may look something like this:

  
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Addendum Dec 3, 2015

Commenters below the line have expressed reservations about Brammer that I'll address in more detail here. The reservations raised thus far fall into the following categories:

1. It does not compound value / acquisitions are dilutive / there's no operating leverage.

These are historical questions and this is the long term record. 

Let's say that one bought a share of Brammer in 2004 at 6x underlying earnings. (I'll turn to the exceptional items further down). These are the returns that one would have received:

In and out at the same multiple returns 15%. One can infer, roughly speaking, that the way to have lost money would have been to either pay a higher multiple or, worse, to have applied a higher multiple on peak earnings.

My argument: (a) It is not likely that this is peak earnings per share. (b) It is not likely that 6x earnings is as high a multiple as we are likely to see over the next 2, 5, or 10 years. 


2. It does not convert earnings into cash

This is also a historical question and, again, the long-term record is as follows

 


3. What about all those XO items?

The XO items are acquisitions related. Therefore I treat them as CapEx items as follows:

Again, the XO items have not disappeared and are not being ignored. They have been reclassified in order to make things easier to understand. Like this, for example:

Lever it up (see below) and the marginal return on invested equity is >20%.

4. It doesn't manage its balance sheet well

 
Prior to 2007 it had no equity to speak of. Since then it has effectively had a policy of using a ~ 60:40 Debt:Equity ratio  in order to generate 20% returns on equity.

5. There is no downside protection

In case of a cyclical (rather than secular) downturn, I suppose. 

We've had one major cyclical downturn in the last 10 years and working capital reversals came through as the business model would predict.

6.  Potential future threat of online distribution

This is the most important issue, in my view, and there are no definitive answers. What I can say is that the business most like Brammer that I know of -- Fabory -- with similar exposure to explosive growth in Eastern Europe, was acquired by Grainger at a multiple of 1x sales in 2011. 

So the question becomes, if Brammer is unable to develop its own online distribution capability, would it be cheaper to replicate its 1 million item stock list, its dozens or well-placed distribution centers, and its list of tens of thousands of customers? Or would it be cheaper to buy it at, say, 0.5x sales? I think the latter.

That's all I've got for the moment. 

Disclosure: No position (yet). 

Global Testing Corporation -- Semiconductor testing services

Introduction

Global Testing Corporation is a Taiwanese company listed on the Singapore Exchange. It provides testing services -- e.g. wafer sorting, final testing services, test program development, conversion and optimization services, load board and probe card design, and leasing of testers -- to the semi-conductor industry, focusing on logic and mixed signal semi-conductors used in consumer electronics and communication devices. 

Its main testing facilities in Hsin Chu, Taiwan and Sunnyvale, CA service customers such as Taiwan Semiconductor, United Microelectronics, Marvell Technology, ALi Corp, Realtek Semiconductor and Sunplus Technology Co Ltd.

There top line declines seen above are a indicative of the secular decline in consumer electronics over the period and, as one can see from the Return on Invested Capital line, this is not a wonderful business.

The Investment Case

1. Depreciation rates in excess of its maintenance capital expenditure requirements have caused GTC to accumulate large accounting losses since its incorporation in 2004.

2. Singapore incorporated businesses with retained losses are restricted from paying out dividends. One way around this is to instead buy back shares sufficient to reduce the equity capital of the company by (at least) the amount of the accumulated losses. Capital  reduction  in this way enables  the company write  off  its  accumulated  losses  by  cutting  an  equivalent  amount of stockholders’ stakeholding.

From GTC's Letter to Shareholders prior to its capital reduction excercise this year:

and from the 3Q 2015 Financial Statements (the left hand column is at Sep 30, 2015):

3. Given the state of play in GTC's end markets -- and given also the capital allocation practices at Yageo Corp, also owned by Pierre Chen -- it is more likely than not that it intends to return the lion's share, probably 100%, of its free cash flows to shareholders by instituting a dividend policy and opportunistically buying back shares.

From the Letter to Shareholders

4.  GTC's free cash flows can likely support  payouts in excess of SGD $10 million per year, implying a payout yield of > 35% 

Disclosure: I own some shares in Global Testing Corporation

Singapore Shipping Corporation -- Pure Car and Truck Carriers

Business model

This company operates in two segments. Via its shipping segment it is what is known a "gross tonnage provider" for major car and truck carrier operators. That's just what it sounds like: SSC buys ships that it immediately leases to, for example, Wallenius or NYK Line for fifteen year terms or longer. These operators in turn carry Toyotas, Mazdas and the like from the places where they are manufactured to the places where they are sold. 

The gross tonnage provider -- SSC in this case -- benefits by locking in stable, long term cash flows albeit at lower average daily charter rates than it could command in the short-term charter market. This allows it to finance the purchase of the ships using lots of very low cost debt.  The charterer, in turn, benefits by earning a spread between the rates at which it charters the ships from SSC and the rates that it charges the auto manufacturers in the shorter term (usually one year or two year) market. 

Relationships between charterers and PCTC ship owners tend to last for decades and ships are often chartered for back-to-back 15 year terms. Entering the market in the absence of such a relationship is unlikely to succeed.

SSC also has an agency and logistics segment that I won't be discussing here (though I'll address any questions in the comments).

Earning power

The above values are in US dollars, SSC's operating currency. Capricornus, Centaurus and Taurus Leader are new enough acquisitions that their impact on SSC's earning power has not yet been fully felt.  

So the market's valuation of SSC is offering what looks like a 15% earnings yield when the weighted average cost of SSC's debt is in the 2% range and the equity risk premium for the SGX composite is ~6%. On that basis alone, SSC is trading at half its value.

SSC is an 80+ year old company now chaired by the second generation and managed by the third, and it prides itself on returning cash to shareholders -- $200 million since 2008, 5.5c per share over the last ten years and so on.  If it were not for its growth plans the year ahead dividend yield would be 15% -- attractive when adjusted for the risk, which is far below average.

Growth

SSC's owner managers have also earned a reputation for doing what they say they will, and what they have been saying over the last year is that they are committed to doubling their fleet within three or four years. 

I think that SSC can pay out roughly 1/3 of free cash flow in this period as dividends and will use 2/3 to provide the equity portion of its investments in new PCTCs. If so, it can buy one $US 80 million ship per year. Again, these purchases are made once under contract to the charterer and use very low cost debt financing. Taurus Leader, SSC's latest purchase was financed by >96% LTV debt at sub 2% interest rates. I am modeling 80% debt financing at 2% interest. 

In any case I think it reasonable that the earning (and value) progression should look something like this:

and therefore

Risks

The principal attraction of this idea is on the risk side of things. The upside is fine -- the stock is, in my view, worth north of $0.60/share today and will likely be worth ~$1/share in two or three years. But is the relative brevity of the list of things that can go wrong that stands out most. 

These are quality owner managers running a company contracted to receive  fixed, multiyear cash flows from blue-chip counterparties and who have made credible promises to return excess cash to shareholders.

The one wrinkle that one ought to think about is the recent price-fixing charges brought against a number of players in the RORO charter industry. If price fixing were a necessary part of the charterer's business models then SSC's growth beyond the immediate 3 or 4 year period may not be all that it could have been.

Summary

The no-growth scenario implies a value in excess of $0.60/share.  As a point of reference, the present value of the contracts in place and the residual value of the ships at the end of these contracts is in excess of $0.40/share when discounted at 8%.

The no-growth scenario may notbe fully appreciated because the full impact of the recently acquired ships is not reflected in SSCs trailing 12 month results.

The growth scenario implies a valuation in the $1/share range.

Disclosure: I own some shares in SSC

Macro Enterprises Inc - Update

14 months on and one finds Macro decidedly out of favor. One can evaluate the pricing of the stock as follows:

 

These are low expectations -- i.e., that the company will do approximately $30 million in annual work at 20% gross margins -- and, in light of what should be the steady nature of its bread and butter pipeline integrity work, I am not convinced that these expectations are realistic. 

Second, one could attach some significance to the company's recently secured $115 million credit facility from TD Bank. This facility is intended to enable the company to post bid and performance bonds for possible LNG pipeline construction projects in the near future.  

Surety bonds for this type of work usually amount to 10% of a project's value and Macro would be bidding as one, small member in a consortium of contractors.  That, I think, gives a fair indication of the scale of the upside potential beyond (1) multiple expansion to some realistic, non-zero number and (2) a return to O&G prices in the US$60+/$2.75+ ranges seen in recent years. 

In other words, even if Macro's legacy work is worth zero, it seems to me unlikely that the option that it may win some LNG pipeline work  is also worth zero.

Macro is to be sure a "cigar butt" but, like Dawson, it is not a bad one and may yet turn out to be an excellent one.

 

 

Disclosure: I own some shares in Macro Enterprises

800 Super Holdings - Waste management

Orientation

800 Super is a waste management company in Singapore. It has been in business since 1988 and was publicly listed in 2011. 

Large public sector contracts for waste collection, recycling, street cleaning, and lansdscaping tend to be awarded for 6 to 8 year terms and smaller, private and quasi-private sector contracts are awarded for one to three year terms.  

800 Super is one of four licensed, larger players eligible to bid for public waste management contracts.  

One might, as a first cut, weigh up the non-cyclical nature of the sector, ROIC, the counterparties etc and come up with a valuation that approximates 2x net operating assets less net debt as fair value for the equity, or $0.65/share. Or one could arrive at the same figure by using 9.5x trailing earning. Or one could compare 800 Super to its very close comparable peer, Colex Holdings, and come to the same conclusion. In any case, that's not a bad place to start. 

The opportunity

800 Super has been awarded (and re-awarded) major public sector contracts that are priced more attractively than the contracts that it had been operating under.  

For example, the Ang Mo Kio waste management contract was re-awarded to 800 Super in January 2014 and runs until September 2021. The predecessor contract (2006-2013) paid $1.05 million per month whereas the current contract pays $1.74 million per month. 

The Integrated Public Cleaning (or street sweeping) contract for the North East region, since lost, paid $0.52 million per month and has been replaced by the Integrated Public Cleaning contract for the North West region which pays $1.35 million per month. 

Since the cost of services -- supplies, disposal charges, sub-contractor fees, and labor costs -- haven't changed by nearly as much, margins should expand as should earnings.

So far, we have seen this

 

 drive margins as follows

and the investment case, such as it is, is that the next year should see the continuation, and indeed acceleration, of this trend:

If it turns out that way then 9.5 x $18 million in earnings values the equity at $0.94/share. 

If it doesn't work out that way for whatever reason*, 2016's earnings at 2H 2015 margins will come in at  ~$16 million and the equity, at a depressed multiple of 8x may be worth only $0.71/share.

So maybe 50% to $130% capital appreciation potential plus some dividends collected. 

Finally its waste-to-energy plant ought to be functional in 2017 and should, if nothing else, help cut its cost of waste collection services and therefore act an future driver of margin expansion.

edited to correct a table on 11/23/2015

*(I say for whatever reason but the wild card to watch is clearly labor cost. Singapore is labor constrained and one does see occasional spikes in labor cost as occured in 1H 21015)

Disclosure: I own some shares in 800 Super Holdings